Another way to judge whether a policy is heading in
the right direction is to go back to earlier milestones and ask whether
a change of course then would have been a smart idea. If the answer is
yes, it’s fair to assume that the wrong direction before won’t suddenly
transform itself into the right one.
Except for die-hard neoconservatives and George W.
Bush’s staunchest followers, most Americans – if allowed to turn back
the clock to March 2003 – would happily agree to give the United Nations
weapons inspectors more time to complete their search for Iraq’s weapons
of mass destruction.
Though it’s a bitter pill for the Bush team to
swallow, even with a swig of fine Bordeaux, the French were right. If
their advice had been taken, more than 2,500 U.S. soldiers and tens of
thousands of Iraqis might be alive today – and the United States might
have averted a strategic disaster.
Even looking back at post-invasion high points,
like Saddam Hussein’s capture, many Americans might wish the Bush
administration had opted for a “declare victory and leave” approach. But
Bush saw each positive development as encouragement to press on toward a
more total victory.
In retrospect, Bush’s policy might be summed up by
the slogan, “Who knows? We might get lucky.”
Grim and Grimmer
But, as the Iraq news grows grim and grimmer, the
U.S. occupation of Iraq shows no sign of getting lucky.
Sectarian strife between Sunnis and Shiites
continues to inflict widespread bloodshed, while some U.S. troops have
been fingered as trigger-happy participants in the slaughter of Iraqis.
It also doesn’t help that the Bush administration –
by lowering standards to meet U.S. military recruitment goals – has been
sending unfit soldiers and even sociopaths into the baking-hot tinderbox
that is today’s Iraq.
In 2004, many military strategists shook their
heads at the notion of putting the likes of Lynndie England and Charles
Graner in positions of authority over detainees inside Abu Ghraib
prison. But now the U.S. military is grappling with even worse scandals,
the alleged murders of Iraqi civilians by out-of-control soldiers and
On July 9, the U.S command accused five soldiers of
complicity in the rape/murder of an Iraqi girl and the slaying of three
members of her family in Mahmudiya, 20 miles south of Baghdad. The
atrocity allegedly was carried out on March 12 after the girl had
complained about advances from U.S. soldiers at local checkpoints.
A sixth American, Steven D. Green, was arrested in
North Carolina on June 30 and accused in civilian court as the leader of
the rape-murder. The former private first-class had been discharged from
the Army over an unspecified “personality disorder.”
U.S. officials initially said the rape victim
was 20 years old, but relatives identified the victim as Abeer Qasim
Hamza al-Janabi, whose passport put her age at 14. The
rape-murder case, which has further stoked anti-Americanism in Iraq,
comes on the heels of an alleged massacre of 24 Iraqi men, women and
children at Haditha and a spate of other accusations against U.S.
The Mahmudiya case also coincides with reports that
pressure to relax enlistment standards has opened the door to the U.S.
military for white supremacists, “skinheads,” neo-Nazis and a variety of
In a report entitled “A
Few Bad Men,” the Southern Poverty Law Center, which has long kept
an eye on violent right-wing extremists, said “military recruiters and
base commanders, under intense pressure from the war in Iraq to fill the
ranks, often look the other way” as white supremacists enter the
The report, written by David Holthouse, quoted
Defense Department gang detective Scott Barfield as saying that
neo-Nazis “stretch across all branches of service, they are linking up
across branches once they’re inside, and they are hard-core. … We’ve got
Aryan Nations graffiti in Baghdad. That’s a problem.”
Indeed. Violence-prone white racists might not be
the best envoys of American values to send into the 100-plus
temperatures of Iraq where U.S. forces must deal daily with a myriad of
complex and lethal threats. Even the best of the U.S. troops must cope
with language difficulties and a foreign culture divided by centuries of
hostilities between Shiites and Sunnis.
The fighting in Iraq also has become multi-sided.
In recent days, the U.S. military has hit both Sunni and Shiite
factions, a development that recalls the bloody fighting in 2004 when
American casualties spiked amid street battles that sometimes pitted
Sunnis and Shiites against Americans.
Like then, the U.S. military is mounting operations
against the powerful Mahdi Army, allied with militant Shiite cleric
Moktada al-Sadr. On July 7, Iraqi government and U.S. forces captured
two Mahdi Army leaders and launched a raid on a militia bastions on July
8. [NYT, July 10, 2006]
The arc of recent events is clearly pointing in a
Yet, while the Iraq military situation seems to be
swirling into a downward spiral, U.S. policymakers in Washington appear
relatively safe from the consequences. Republicans even believe they can
use the war, again, as a partisan club for beating back any Democratic
challenge to Bush’s authority in Election 2006.
Any talk of a phased withdrawal of U.S. troops from
Iraq is confronted with charges of “cut and run,” cowardice or treason.
Republican political strategists also believe they
have succeeded in stabilizing Bush’s political decline by sharpening the
rhetoric against Democrats, the New York Times and other critics of the
Both Democratic and Republican strategists have
told me in recent days that they see GOP prospects for Election 2006
brightening, largely because the Democrats have failed to offer a
coherent alternative on Iraq and the Republicans have swung onto the
Reinforcing that point, Democratic strategists
offered me two diametrically opposed views of why the Democrats were
floundering and what they should do on Iraq.
One school held that Democrats needed to tilt more
to the right and select more conservative candidates; the other faction
blamed Democratic leaders for demoralizing their base with mealy-mouthed
positions on Bush’s abuse of constitutional power at home and the Iraq
In official Washington, the notion of an Iraq
withdrawal is still not supported by many policymakers or
opinion-leaders. The exceptions are mostly Democrats, such as Rep. John
Murtha of Pennsylvania and Russ Feingold of Wisconsin.
But Republicans and their right-wing allies remain
eager to pound anyone who advocates an Iraq pullout. Meanwhile, most
centrist Democrats and many mainstream pundits argue that while the
invasion may have been a mistake, the U.S. now has a moral obligation to
stay in Iraq until the violence settles down.
There’s also the question of the United States
losing face if a withdrawal is seen around the world as a defeat. Bush
and other war defenders argue, too, that a U.S. pullout would turn Iraq
into a base for international terrorism.
Some war critics counter that the war’s supporters
should have thought of those possibilities before plunging into the
quicksand of Iraq.
At Consortiumnews.com, in 2002, we questioned
Bush’s “preemptive war” strategy [“Bush’s
Grim Vision”] and his specific case for invading Iraq [“Misleading
the Nation to War”]. In the days after the March 19, 2003,
invasion, we cited ominous signs from tougher-than-expected Iraqi
of Pigs Meets Black Hawk Down”].
Almost a year ago, in August 2005, we laid out the
arguments for a prompt U.S. military withdrawal [“Iraq
& the Logic of Withdrawal”]. That article noted that Washington
yet to conduct a clear-headed examination of the worsening military
situation, with Bush supporters simply saying “stay the course” and
former war critics intoning “we must get it right.”
“But,” the article stated, “there is a case to be
made for U.S. withdrawal as the best option for both resolving the
conflict and neutralizing the foreign Islamic extremists in Iraq. A
corollary of this thinking holds that the continued U.S. military
presence does more harm than good.”
Basically, the logic behind withdrawal was that the
removal of U.S. troops would undercut the al-Qaeda-connected foreign
jihadists who represent a small but violent part of the Iraqi
insurgency. An American pullout would remove the incentive for many
young Muslims to go to Iraq and for those already there to stay.
Meanwhile, the Sunni resistance might lose any
tolerance for the outside extremists. With the U.S. occupation ended,
the usefulness of the jihadists would be diminished. Plus, many Iraqi
Sunnis, like Iraqi Shiites, are deeply offended by the horrific
brutality of the al-Qaeda faction.
So, rather than Iraq becoming an al-Qaeda base if
U.S. forces withdrew, there is an argument for the exact opposite – and
for the belief that the longer U.S. troops stay in Iraq, the more likely
al-Qaeda operatives will put down roots and will be harder to weed out.
There is also recent evidence that al-Qaeda shares
that analysis. The terrorist group sees its goals advanced by Bush’s
interventionist strategies and threatened by a prompt U.S. withdrawal
As far back as summer 2001, U.S. intelligence knew
that al-Qaeda was disappointed by the restrained U.S. reaction to its
bombing of the USS Cole in 2000 and was determined that the next attack
– the one on Sept. 11, 2001 – would compel a much more aggressive U.S.
response. If it were clumsy enough, that would help al-Qaeda.
This al-Qaeda strategy was revealed by New York
Times reporter Judith Miller in a 2006 interview with
Alternet. Miller said a well-placed
CIA official briefed her on an al-Qaeda intercept over the July Fourth
holiday in 2001.
“The person told me that there was some concern
about an intercept that had been picked up,” Miller said. “The incident
that had gotten everyone’s attention was a conversation between two
members of al-Qaeda. And they had been talking to one another,
supposedly expressing disappointment that the United States had not
chosen to retaliate more seriously against what had happened to the
[destroyer USS] Cole [which was bombed on Oct. 12, 2000].
“And one al-Qaeda operative was overheard saying to
the other, ‘Don’t worry; we’re planning something so big now that the
U.S. will have to respond.’”
In the Alternet interview, published in May 2006
after Miller resigned from the Times, the reporter expressed regret that
she had not been able to nail down enough details about the intercept to
get the story into the newspaper.
But the significance of her recollection is that
more than two months before the 9/11 attacks, the CIA knew that al-Qaeda
was planning a major attack with the intent of provoking a U.S. military
reaction – or overreaction.
The CIA tried to warn Bush about the threat on Aug.
6, 2001, with the hope that presidential action could energize
government agencies and head off the attack. The CIA sent analysts to
his ranch in Crawford, Texas, to brief him and deliver a report entitled
“Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US.”
Bush was not pleased by the intrusion. He glared at
the CIA briefer and snapped, “All right, you’ve covered your ass,”
according to Ron Suskind’s new book, The One Percent Doctrine.
Bush then returned to a vacation of fishing, clearing brush and working
on a speech about stem-cell research.
The 9/11 Attacks
When the 9/11 attacks occurred, the United States
did hit back against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. But after Osama bin-Laden
and other leaders escaped, Bush quickly turned the U.S. military’s
attention to the Iraq invasion, which followed in March 2003.
After the U.S.-led invasion ousted Saddam Hussein
in April 2003, al-Qaeda operatives, including Jordanian terrorist Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi, flooded into central Iraq bringing along a generation
of new recruits. Soon, the group’s signature suicide-bombings were
killing Iraqis and Americans alike.
Though al-Qaeda’s brand of terrorism appeared to be
making a comeback in Iraq, bin-Laden apparently saw a danger in fall
2004 – the potential defeat of George W. Bush and the possible start of
U.S. withdrawal under John Kerry.
So, according to CIA analysts, bin-Laden timed his
release of a videotape denouncing Bush to the Friday before the Nov. 2,
2004, election. CIA analysts concluded that bin-Laden’s tirade had the
desired effect, giving the Bush campaign a last-minute boost and
ensuring the continuation of Bush’s policies. [As reported in Ron
Suskind’s The One Percent Doctrine, or see Consortiumnews.com’s “CIA:
Osama Helped Bush in ‘04.”]
By summer 2005, despite Bush’s victory over Kerry,
al-Qaeda leaders were still fretting about the dangers of a prompt U.S.
withdrawal from Iraq. A 6,000-word letter purportedly written by bin-Laden’s
deputy Ayman Zawahiri on July 9, 2005, to Zarqawi suggested tactics for
keeping the jihadists from quitting if the U.S. forces did pull out.
“The mujahedeen must not have their mission end
with the expulsion of the Americans from Iraq, and then lay down their
weapons, and silence the fighting zeal,” the “Zawahiri letter” said.
[See Consortiumnews.com’s “Al-Qaeda
Letter Belies Bush’s Iraq Claims.”]
Another argument for American withdrawal is that it
could push the Shiites and their Kurdish allies into compromising with
the Sunni minority on an overall settlement and rewriting the
constitution to grant the Sunnis a larger share of the oil revenues.
Throughout the U.S. occupation, the Shiites and
Kurds have had little reason to make significant concessions to the
Sunnis because the American military tilted the power balance in favor
of the Shiite-Kurdish side.
As for the issue of whether a U.S. withdrawal would
strengthen American enemies, Bush has argued that a U.S. pullout from
Iraq would open the way to Islamic extremists controlling a vast empire
from Spain to Indonesia.
The claims are reminiscent of the Vietnam War, when
U.S. policymakers warned of a “domino effect” of country after country
falling to communism and when Richard Nixon said the United States would
be viewed as a “pitiful, helpless giant” if it caved on Vietnam. In
reality, the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam did not have the dire
consequences that were predicted.
With an Iraq withdrawal, Washington also might be
able to capitalize on a resurgence of Muslim good will, especially if a
pullout is followed by a renewed commitment to seek a fair resolution of
the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and to support political reform in
repressive Arab states.
On a more tactical level, a U.S. withdrawal also
would free up Special Forces to concentrate on tracking down and
eliminating al-Qaeda’s leadership, an operation that was disrupted by
Bush’s hasty decision to focus on Iraq in 2002.
Without doubt, there are serious risks from
whatever course of action the United States follows in Iraq. A bloody
civil war could occur whether the U.S. military is present or not; U.S.
enemies might be emboldened whether the United States is bogged down in
Iraq or has repositioned its troops outside the country.
One reading of the intransigence from Iran and
North Korea is that those other “axis of evil” countries learned a
lesson from Iraq, which stopped developing WMD and trusted that the U.N.
could fend off a U.S. invasion. Hussein’s defeat demonstrated that only
fearsome weapons could give pause to Bush’s “preemptive war” strategies.
Neither Iran nor North Korea senses any great
benefit from compromising on matters of their own national security.
Plus, with U.S. forces tied down in Iraq, Washington’s ability to
enforce any ultimatums is much weaker than it normally would be.
Iran knows, too, that it can retaliate against any
U.S. attack simply by unleashing its Iraqi Shiite allies against
vulnerable U.S. troops in Iraq.
So, there remains a compelling logic for
withdrawal. But it is a complicated argument to make, while the other
side can simply yell, “cut and run.”
Robert Parry broke many of the Iran-Contra
stories in the 1980s for the Associated Press and Newsweek. His latest book, Secrecy & Privilege: Rise of the Bush Dynasty from
Watergate to Iraq, can be ordered at
secrecyandprivilege.com. It's also available at
Amazon.com, as is his 1999 book, Lost History: Contras, Cocaine,
the Press & 'Project Truth.'